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ABSTRACT. Should religion be singled out in the law? This Article evaluates two
influential theories of freedom of religion in political theory, before introducing an
alternative one. The first approach, the Substitution approach, argues that freedom
of religion can be adequately expressed by a substitute category: typically, freedom
of conscience. The second, the Proxy approach, argues that the notion of religion
should be upheld in the law, albeit as a proxy for a range of different goods. After
showing that neither approach adequately meets crucial desiderata for an inclusive
theory of religious freedom, the Article sets out the Disaggregation approach and
defends against the alternatives.
Over the last few decades, sociologists, anthropologists, lawyers and
religious studies scholars have put the category of ‘religion’ under
intense critical scrutiny. This criticism has – belatedly, but vigorously
– found echoes in the political theory of religious freedom. Promi-
nent political philosophers have been asking questions such as: what
justifies the special treatment of religion in the law? Do legal con-
structions of religious freedom adequately protect all forms of
religious life? And is the special protection of religion an unfair
privilege granted to religious believers?1
Liberal political philosophers reject two possible approaches to
these questions from the outset. The first asserts that religion, be-
cause it is rooted in the duties we have to a transcendental being,
1 Ronald Dworkin, Religion without God (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013); Brian
Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013); Charles Taylor and Jocelyn
Maclure, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). On the
political theory of the U.S. Religion Clauses, see Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager, Religious
Freedom and the Constitution (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007); Andrew Koppelman,
DefendingAmerican Religious Neutrality (Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 2013); Micah
Schwartzman, ‘What If Religion Is Not Special?’, University of Chicago Law Review 79 (2012), pp. 1351–
1427.
Law and Philosophy (2015) 34: 581–600  The Author(s). This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com 2015
DOI 10.1007/s10982-015-9236-y
expresses our essential nature as God-created creatures; and there-
fore deserves special deference and respect.2 Liberal political
philosophers, following John Rawls, start from the idea that a just
political order should be responsive to a pluralism of ethical princi-
ples and ways of life.3 It should not entrench any particular (here,
theistic) conception of the good life as worthy of politico-legal pro-
tection. The second possible approach is that endorsed by most
critical scholars of religion. It denounces, not simply the notions of
religion and freedom of religion, but the core ideals of normative
liberalism (secularism, religious freedom, the separation between
public and private, state sovereignty, and so forth) as ethnocentric,
mystifying and oppressive. The project of liberal political philosophy,
by contrast, is a normative one. Its response to the defaults of par-
ticular laws and institutions is not to throw its hands in despair and
lament that religious freedom, or liberal justice, are ‘mission
impossible’.4 It tries, rather, to articulate appropriate standards that
can serve as benchmarks to evaluate (and reform) existing state of
affairs.
The political theorists’ approach is normative in a further sense. It
seeks to identify the core values that should be protected by the law.
As a result, it eschews purely descriptive or semantic approaches to
legal terms. When it considers freedom of religion, it is not con-
cerned with defining what religion is – an elusive project at best, as
critical scholars of religion have amply shown.5 Rather, it rejects any
essentialist or semantic approach; and is concerned with identifying
the core values that the law can properly express.6 This is important
2 Michael W. McConnell, ‘Why Protect Religious Freedom?’, 123 Yale Law Journal (2013), pp. 770–
792; Michael Stokes Paulsen, ‘The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty’, 39 Pepperdine Law
Rev 1159 (2013); Rafael Domingo, ‘Religion for Hedgehogs? An Argument against the Dworkinian
Approach to Religious Freedom’, Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 1 (2012), pp. 1–22.
3 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1996).
4 Stanley Fish, ‘Mission Impossible: Setting the Just Boundaries between Church and State’, Columbia
Law Review 97(8) (1997), pp. 2255–2333; Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
5 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990);
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Paying the Words Extra: Religious Discourse in the Supreme Court of the United
States (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular. Chris-
tianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Jonathan Z. Smith, Relating Religion:
Essays in the Study of Religions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), Tomoko Mazuzawa, The
Invention of World Religions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), Tim Fitzgerald, The Ideology of
Religious Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
6 Two interpretive theories of religious freedom are Timothy Macklem, ‘Faith as a Secular Value’,
McGill Law Journal 45, Part 1, 1.65 (2000), pp. 1–64; Dworkin, Religion without God.
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because not all values can, or indeed should, be expressed by the law.
Just as we would not want the law to express the whole of the value
of ‘the family’, for example, so we would not want the law to
capture of the whole of the value of religion. At best, the law will put
forward an interpretive notion of ‘the family’, or of religion. That a
particular law or theory does not capture what religion really is,
therefore, is not, in itself, a sufficient objection to it. What matters is
that the law, or the theory, expresses and protects the correct
underlying values. It is at this more fundamental level that inter-
pretive approaches must be assessed and evaluated.
With these preliminaries in mind, let me set out the aim of this paper.
In what follows, I evaluate two influential interpretive theories of
freedom of religion in political theory, before articulating and defending
an alternative one. The first, which I call the substitution approach, argues
that freedom of religion can be adequately expressed by a substitute
category: typically, freedom of conscience. The second, the proxy ap-
proach, argues that the notion of religion should be upheld in the law,
albeit as a proxy for a range of different goods. After showing that neither
approach adequately meets crucial desiderata for an inclusive theory of
religious freedom, I set out my preferred approach – the disaggregation
approach – and defend it against the alternatives.
I. THREE DESIDERATA
Before describing the various approaches, I begin, in the first section,
by identifying the desiderata that an inclusive theory of religious
freedom must meet. I do so by surveying common criticisms of the
existing law of religious freedom, both from critical and normative
standpoints. They are all formulated against the implicit or explicit
background of a theory of fairness as inclusiveness. Three different
lines of critique have been developed: religious freedom is construed
too narrowly to protect a range of valuable religious practices ade-
quately; religious freedom is rooted in a sectarian view that religion
itself is a special good; and the privileges of religious freedom treat
non-religious citizens unfairly. Let me explain these in more detail.
1. Too narrow
A number of critical scholars have argued that the legal treatment of
religion still bears the marks of the ethnocentric, western, textualist,
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Protestant and belief-based understandings of religion that have
accompanied the rise of the modern, secular euro-Atlantic state. As a
result, religions that are more practice-, tradition- or ritual-based
have fared badly under the liberal law of religious freedom. There
are many illustrations of this distortion. Saba Mahmood and other
writers influenced by Talal Asad have argued that liberal law
struggles to protect embodied practices of piety – paradigmatically,
Islamic veiling practices.7 Winnifred Sullivan has shown how the
elitist, textualist Protestant bias of US judges renders them incapable
of capturing the popular, unruly, ritualised religiosity which she saw
at work in the baroque funerary displays in a Florida cemetery.8
Constitutional commentators have castigated a US Supreme Court
decision which failed to see government logging plans through a
Native American sacred territory as an infringement of religious
freedom (Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,
1988).9
This criticism is valid and important, provided it is clarified in two
crucial ways. First, for reasons adduced in the introduction, it has to
be presented as an interpretive not a semantic critique. In other
words, the claim should not be that the existing law does not protect
all that is religious, according to some ordinary-meaning, semantic
understanding of the term. Rather, the claim is that the law fails to
protect practices which exhibit those normative values – still to be
specified – which are valuable in religion. Second, the critique must
be formulated carefully. Some versions of it suggest that what is
wrong with the liberal law of freedom of religion is that it protects
only beliefs, and not practices.10 If that is the claim, it is mistaken.
While it is true that canonical liberal accounts of freedom of religion
7 Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2005).
8 Sullivan, Impossibility of Religious Freedom.
9 Lori Beaman, ‘Aboriginal Spirituality and the Legal Construction of Freedom of Religion’, Journal
of Church and State 44(Winter) (2002), pp. 135–149; Tisa Wenger, We Have a Religion: The 1920s Pueblo
Indian Dance Controversy and American Religious Freedom (Chapel Hill: North Carolina Press 2009), pp.
255–258; Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution. Part 1: Free Exercice (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1996), pp. 196–199.
10 This criticism can, however be validly applied to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
jurisprudence on freedom of religion. The Court has over-emphasised the distinction between forum
internum and forum externum, notably in order to deny religious freedom protections to ‘manifestations’
of religious belief involving Islamic dress and symbols. See, eg., Carolyn Evans, ‘The ‘‘Islamic Head-
scarf’’ in the European Court of Human Rights’, 7 Melbourne Journal of International Law, 2006; Isabelle
Rorive, ‘Religious Symbols in the Public Space: In Search of a European Answer’, 30 Cardozo Law Review
(2008–2009), pp. 2673–2674.
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– from John Locke onwards – distinguish (with good reason) be-
tween freedom of thought and belief on the one hand, and freedom
of expression and practice on the other, this does not mean that the
latter is left unprotected. That religious life has an essentially
expressive dimension has been at the core of struggles over religious
freedom for centuries. And the modern cases of religious exemptions
from liberal laws have all concerned religious practices, not merely
religious belief. This is true, for example, of Sabbatarian exemptions,
conscientious objection to military service, and accommodation of
religious dress in workplaces, to name just a few.
If that is correct, what does the Too Narrow critique amount to? In my
view, it should be formulated as a more precise claim, as follows: the
standard law of religious freedom tends to protectpractices that are believed to
be a matter of compulsory obligation. For example, Quaker pacifists see
themselves as under a stringent duty to refuse to bear arms; Sabbatarians
see themselves as obligated to honor the God-designed day of rest, and so
forth. TheTooNarrow critique here, then, is that a range of non-Christian, or
non-Protestant practices, when they do not directly express a belief in a
divine injunction, are less likely to be protected by the liberal state. One
example of such a narrow view of religious practice is the ruling of some
European judges, in Islamic veiling cases, that because the hijab is not a
compulsory requirement of the Muslim faith, it does not fall under the
protection of religious freedom. Another example is the Florida burial
displays studied by Sullivan. Insofar as much of religious activity is rooted in
orthopraxy rather than orthodoxy, the Too Narrow critique is effective. An
important desideratum of an inclusive theory of religious freedom is that it
is not narrowly biased in favour of obligation-based belief and practices.
2. Sectarian
The critique here points in a different direction. It is that freedom of
religion protects a sectarian good – a good whose value is not
universally recognised. It is a relic from an earlier age, one that has
little justification in contemporary pluralistic societies where religion
is only one of the things that people value. Some political theorists,
for example, point out that the liberal state should protect generic
capacities or moral powers, such as people’s ability to form, revise
and live by their conception of the good, whatever it might be.11 The
11 Rawls, Political Liberalism.
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liberal state, then, should content itself with protecting generic rights
and freedoms, such as thought, belief, expression, and association. It
should not favour one specific way in which the good is pursued,
namely, the religious life. The liberal state, to be properly inclusive
of all its citizens, should only appeal to values and ideals that all can,
in principle, recognise and adhere to. For this to be the case, the
relevant values have to be abstract rather than concrete; general
rather than specific; ecumenical rather than sectarian.
3. Unfair to non-religious people
This criticism follows from the previous one. One consequence of
the sectarian privileging of religion in the law, it is argued, is that
non-religious citizens are unfairly treated by the law of religious
freedom. This is particularly the case in the area of legal exemptions
and accommodations. In modern, highly regulated states, citizens are
subjected to a wide array of laws and regulations – ranging from
health, safety and educational requirements to non-discrimination on
grounds of gender or sexuality, or from parking and zoning
regulations through to regulation on dress and uniform. Yet,
typically, the law provides exemptions from these burdensome laws
for religious citizens, but not for non-religious citizens.
As egalitarian theorists of religious freedom have pointed out, this
is unfair. It is unfair, in particular, if citizens with comparable beliefs
are denied the protections enjoyed by religiously-motivated citizens.
Thus secular pacifists deserve the same level of protection as reli-
gious conscientious objectors – as the US Supreme Court recognised
in celebrated Vietnam war cases (United States v Seeger (1965) and
Welsh v United States (1970). And doctors refusing to abstain from life-
endangering abortions in Catholic hospitals should be able to appeal
to their conscience in the same way as Catholic doctors refusing to
perform abortions.12
We have, then, three desiderata that an inclusive law of religious
freedom must meet. It must not be (i) narrow, (ii) sectarian, or (iii)
unfair to non-religious people. An immediate objection arises. Can
these desiderata be met simultaneously? On the face of it, it seems
12 Taylor and Maclure, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience; Eisgruber and Sager, Religious Freedom
and the Constitution; Micah Schwartzman, ‘What If Religion Is Not Special?’, Micah Schwartzman,
‘Religion as a Legal Proxy’, paper presented to the APSA Annual Meeting, Washington D.C. 28 August–
1 September 2014 (available at SSRN http://ssrn.com/abstract=2416254).
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that they point in opposite directions: one cannot satisfy them all at
the same time. Thus, if the law does not single out the seemingly
sectarian good of religion (ii) it is unlikely that it will be able to
protect all valuable religious practices (i). In what follows, I argue
that two existing strategies – the substitution strategy, and the proxy
strategy – are indeed vulnerable to this ‘trilemma’, in that they fail to
reconcile the three desiderata. Either they are non-sectarian but too
narrow; or they accommodate all valuable religious practices but are
sectarian in their valuing of religion itself. I then suggest that my
proposed alternative – the disaggregation strategy – succeeds in
meeting the three desiderata at once.
II. THE SUBSTITUTION STRATEGY
The substitution strategy is favoured by prominent egalitarian the-
orists of religious freedom.13 The general structure of the theory is
clear enough. It is the human capacity for moral or spiritual agency,
not for leading good lives with a determinate, perhaps religious,
content, that grounds the respect that the state owes to persons qua
persons. Rawls, for example, argued that what the liberal state
protects is a generic ability or moral power: people’s capacity to
form, revise, and live by their conception of the good. More recently,
Ronald Dworkin has suggested that religious freedom is not sui
generis and is only one implication of a right to ethical indepen-
dence.14
But now egalitarian theorists of religious freedom face a problem.
If religious freedom is broadened and dissolved into a general right of
ethical independence, it will only ground a general right of moral
freedom. It will not ground any special right of exemption. As
Dworkin has argued, if the liberal state is to be neutral between
different ways of pursuing the good (be it a life of religious piety,
scholarly pursuit, or consumerist materialism), it becomes impossible
to carve out a specific area of protection from the law. Yet while
Dworkin is ready (at least on principle15) to bite this particular bullet,
13 Taylor and Maclure, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience; Micah Schwartzmann, ‘What if Religion
is not Special?’ and ‘Religion as a Legal Proxy’. See also Martha Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In
Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality (New York: Basic Boooks, 2008).
14 Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 376.
15 But not consistently. See Cécile Laborde, ‘Dworkin’s Religious Freedom without God’, Boston
University Law Review 94(4) (2014), pp. 1255–1271.
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no other egalitarian theorist does so.16 All seek to justify the principle
of exemptions from the law. This means that they need to distin-
guish, among the vast range of commitments and conceptions of the
good that people hold in pluralistic societies, those that deserve
special protection. It is not sufficient to appeal to a ‘thin theory’ of
the good à la Rawls or Dworkin. Egalitarian theorists need a more
substantive theory of the specific good that is protected by freedom
of religion in accommodation cases. They need what Charles Taylor,
in Sources of the Self, called ‘strong evaluations’: evaluations about
better or worse, important or trivial conceptions of the good life,
views which are not reducible to mere preferences, desires and
inclinations, but are rather the standards by which desires, prefer-
ences and inclinations can be judged.17
Typically, egalitarian theorists find this good in the value of living
by the demands of one’s conscience. The good protected by freedom of
conscience is the ability to act in accordance with one’s perceived
moral duties, which are seen as categorical.18 Rawls, for example,
justified the ‘lexical priority’ of freedom of conscience by hypothe-
sising that the parties in the original position would under no con-
dition agree to sacrifice the pursuit of their non-negotiable, binding
commitments. Maclure and Taylor argue that religious convictions
ought to be legally protected as convictions of conscience under-
stood as ‘meaning-giving beliefs and commitments’.19 Convictions of
conscience give a moral orientation to people’s life, they are the
fundamental beliefs and commitments that make it possible for
persons to have a moral identity and to make moral judgments.
Egalitarian theorists, then, substitute conscience for religion – or, to
put it differently, they identify acting conscientiously as the core
moral value that is traditionally protected by freedom of religion.
Religion is the semantic term, but conscience is the interpretive
value. If that is the case, then, the law should protect freedom of
conscience, instead of freedom of religion.
16 Taylor and Maclure, Eisgruber and Sager, and Schwartzman all defend exemptions. Even
explicitly anti-exemptionist theorists, such as Brian Barry (Culture and Equality. Cambridge: Polity 2001)
and Brian Leiter (Why Tolerate Religion?), make exceptions to their anti-exception stance.
17 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1989).
18 Paul Bou-Habib, ‘A Theory of Religious Accommodation’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 23(1)
(2006), pp. 109–126.
19 Maclure and Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience, pp. 75–76.
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How does the Substitution Strategy fare in relation to our three
desiderata? I argue that it meets (ii) and (iii) but fails to meet (i). The
Substitution Strategy meets (ii) the Non-Sectarian requirement. This
is because, as Paul Bou-Habib has argued, freedom of conscience is
rooted in a good that many people, both religious and non-religious,
recognise as a valuable good. This is the good of living a life of
integrity: a life where one’s actions cohere with one’s ideas about
what is right for one to do. When people are forced to act against
these convictions, they experience a loss of personal integrity, a
feeling of self-alienation, a sense that their own actions violate the
moral principles that define who they are.20
The Substitution Strategy also meets (iii): it is not unfair towards
non-religious citizens. Having identified the feature in virtue of which
religious practices are protected, egalitarian theorists are then able to
extend protection to non-religious practices which exhibit the same
feature. So they are able to equalize relative comparable burdens. Eis-
gruber and Sager justify the draft exemptions granted to secular paci-
fists during the Vietnam War in this way.21 Maclure and Taylor would
treat secular and religiously-motivated vegetarians equally22; while
Schwartzmann would grant secular doctors in Catholic hospitals the
right to act as their conscience dictates in tricky abortion cases.23 All
these practices are relevantly similar and comparable because they are
rooted in stringent obligations of conscience.
However, the Substitution Strategy fails to meet desideratum (i):
it remains too narrowly tailored to a certain kind of obligation-based
practice. As a result, it is vulnerable to the objection we set out
above, namely, that many valuable religious practices are not mat-
ters of obligation. Crucially, it does not mean that they thereby fail
to express the core value that religious freedom expresses. Assuming
– with Bou-Habib – that this core value is ethical integrity, it is
obvious that many (though not all)24 religious practices protect
20 Bou-Habib, ‘A Theory of Religious Accommodation’, Maclure and Taylor, Secularism and Freedom
of Conscience, pp. 76–77; M. Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience, pp. 19–20, 53–55, Chandran Kukathas, The
Liberal Archipelago. A Theory of Freedom and Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 55.
21 Eisgruber and Sager, Religious Freedom and the Constitution, pp. 113–114.
22 Maclure and Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience.
23 Schwartzmann, ‘Religion as Legal Proxy’.
24 Here I have in mind a range of activities of religious organisations–such as the hiring and firing of
staff, the provision of public services, etc. There is a tendency to define all these activities as ‘religious’
(Cf. Hosanna-Tabor, 2012 and Burwell. V. Hobby Lobby, 2014). In my view, the rights of religious
associations should fall under the right of associations more generally. I make the full case elsewhere.
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ethical integrity, even though they are not rooted in conscience.25
Consider, for example, the following practices: the ingestion of
peyote in Native American ceremonies, the wearing of hijab by
pious Muslim women, or funerary displays in Sullivan’s cemetery.
They are valuable religious practices: valuable because they allow
individuals to live with integrity. But they may not be demands of
conscience strictly speaking.26 Of course, there has been a tendency,
among legal practitioners, to re-describe these practices in the lan-
guage of conscientious obligation, so as to accommodate them under
the label of freedom of religion. But this has been rightly castigated
as a Protestantisation of non-Protestant religion, and this re-de-
scription will not at any rate be relevant to all contested instances.
Paradigmatic of these difficulties is, again, the Lyng case. However
hard one tries, it is difficult to reconcile the intuitions that the pro-
tection of sacred lands is a core dimension of Native American ‘re-
ligious’ life (insofar as it allows members to live with integrity) with
the egalitarian postulate that what freedom of religion protects is the
value of conscience. As we shall now see, the proxy strategy offers a
solution to this particular problem.
III. THE PROXY STRATEGY
Let us first set out the general structure of the proxy strategy, as
recently articulated by Andrew Koppelman.27 The proxy strategy
accepts the general criticisms leveled against the concept of religion
in the law, and endorses the shift from a semantic to an interpretive
approach. In particular, Koppelman argues that there is no essence to
25 Bou-Habib himself seems to concede that the value of integrity cannot be exhausted by con-
science. He writes: ‘as well as depending on compliance with perceived duty, integrity may depend on
one’s attempting continuously (which is not to say incessantly) to discover what one’s duties in fact are.
It seems to me that religious conduct that aims at achieving communion with a divine will or ultimate
reality may have a claim to accommodation under this heading. The ingestion of peyote in the
sacramental worship of NAC is an example’. Bou-Habib, ‘Theory of Religious Accommodation’, p. 123).
26 Andrew Koppelman, ‘Conscience, Volitional Necessity, and Religious Exemptions’, Legal Theory
15 (2009), pp. 215–244, at pp. 222–223.
27 Andrew Koppelman, ‘Religion’s Specialized Specialness’, University of Chicago Law Review Dialogue,
pp. 71–83, at p. 78; Andrew Koppelman, ‘Neutrality and the Religion Analogy’, paper presented to the
APSA Annual Meeting, Washington D.C. 28 August–1 September 2014 (available at SSRN: http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2454399). See also Andrew Koppelman, Defending Amer-
ican Religious Neutrality (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013).
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religion, and that there is no directly identifiable good associated
with religion that the law should aim to identify and protect.
Therefore, the proxy strategy rejects the reductionist move of the
substitution strategy, and points out that whatever is protected
under the label ‘religion’ cannot be reduced to the value of con-
science. Yet the fact that the term ‘religion’ does not refer to one
identifiable good but, rather, to a loose cluster of different goods,
does not mean that it is a useless legal term. On the contrary, the use
of the term ‘religion’ can be seen, in Wittgensteinian fashion, as a
fairly stable linguistic practice exhibiting sufficient ‘family resem-
blance’ to protect a broad range of activities. Inevitably, like all legal
proxies, the term ‘religion’ will be sometimes under-inclusive (when
it fails to protect secular conscience) or over-inclusive (when it
protects religious activities which do not express any particular
good). But, Koppelman argues, it is still better than any other
alternative. He draws an analogy with compulsory driving licenses.
The aim of the law is to ensure safe driving, and it uses driving
licenses as a proxy. Even though there is no guarantee that those
holding a valid driving license, and only they, will be safe drivers, the
proxy is still the best way to approximate safe driving.28
How well does the Proxy Strategy fare in relation to our three
desiderata? I argue that it meets (i) but it fails to meet (ii) and (iii).
First, because it sees religion as a set of loosely connected prac-
tices rather than as an essence, it is able to accommodate the critique
that standard understandings of religion are too narrow. Koppelman
argues, following Greenawalt, that, in practice, courts have rarely
found it difficult to identify what religious practices are. Some judges
may hold a narrow, Protestantized view of the demands of religion,
but this is a feature of their idiosyncratic training and bias, not of the
polysemic and flexible notion of ‘religion’ that has become prevalent
in the law. On the family resemblance view, there is no reason why
they should be biased in this way. On the contrary, a vague notion
allows an ongoing conversation about the meaning of religion, and
suggests the inclusion of unusual or minority religious beliefs and
practices by analogical reasoning.29 Thus practices that have no
connection to a transcendental god or to individual conscience
28 Koppelman, ‘Neutrality and the Religion Analogy’, p. 12.
29 See also Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution, Part 1, pp. 139–142.
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– from Buddhist rituals to Native American traditional practices
– can be brought under the protection of freedom of religion. The
Lyng case – the ‘blind spot’ of the US First Amendment definition of
religion – was wrongly decided only because judges took too narrow
a view of what counts as a burden on religion.30
Second, however, it is not clear that the Proxy Strategy can escape
the charge of being sectarian. This is not only (or necessarily) be-
cause it protects a good that is a good only for some but not for
others. It is, more fundamentally, because it does not aspire to
protect a clearly identifiable, valuable good (or bundle of goods): it is
not clear what religion is a proxy for. Consider, in this context, the
limits of Koppelman’s analogy with the driving license case. In this
case, the law identifies a valuable aim – safe driving – and sets out a
proxy to achieve it, however imperfectly. The structure of freedom
of religion, however, is different. The problem is not that the proxy
achieves the good imperfectly or indirectly (this, after all, is the point
of proxies). The problem, rather, is that it is not clear that the law
protects a good at all. If religion, in the ordinary-meaning semantic
sense, is a complex bundle of things, not all of them good, then it is
not clear that the legal protection of religion actually expresses any
interpretive value at all.31
Third, the proxy strategy does not adequately protect non-reli-
gious practices which, on the face of it, are as valuable as religious
practices. Consider again the Lyng case. Koppelman’s reading of the
case would suggest that as long as a practice can be called ‘religious’,
in the ordinary sense of the term, it will enjoy the protection of
religious freedom. But, as critics have pointed out, the First
Amendment’s singling out of religion has led to a radical distortion
30 Koppelman, ‘Neutrality and the Religion Analogy’, p. 11.
31 To clarify one possible misunderstanding. When I say that religion does not protect only ‘good’
things, I do not refer to religious practices which, say, grievously infringe on the rights of others. When
liberals talk about good and bad religion, they usually have in mind such cases. Religion is not religion,
they claim, when it demands that abortion clinics or shopping centres be bombed, or that children be
denied access to life-saving medicine. I disagree. Insofar far as these actions are expressive of individual’s
ethical integrity, they correctly express religious values. This does not mean to say, of course, that they
should ipso facto be tolerated: in liberal societies, the pursuit of the good is constrained by the demands
of the right. When I say that some religious activities are not ‘good’, what I have in mind, instead, are
practices that are claimed as exercises of religion by religious organisations, yet only have a tenuous
connection to the normative value of ethical integrity. When religious organisations spend money, run
businesses, hire staff, and provide secular services, it is not clear that they ipso facto express the value of
ethical integrity. On the disaggregation theory I favour, as I suggest below, such activities are best
protected under generic rights of freedom of association, with no special concern for the religious
nature of the organisations. The good pursued, here, is associative freedom, not freedom of religion.
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of Native American practices. Aboriginal peoples typically see all
their daily practices as suffused with their community way of life –
praying, but also singing and dancing; respecting sacred burial sites,
but also food gathering, hunting and fishing. When the Pueblo
Indians fought for recognition under the First Amendment, they
were forced arbitrarily to separate their way of life into ‘religious’
and ‘non-religious’ domains. One effect of the singling out of religion
is arbitrarily to favour certain types of activities over more broadly
defined ‘cultural’ or ‘traditional’ practices.32 Such distortions are less
likely to occur under constitutional settlements, such as the Cana-
dian constitution, where religion is not pro tanto more valued than
culture – insofar as both allow their members to live with integrity.33
The worry here is that the privileging of religion over culture in the
US constitution is unfair to those with meaning-giving, integrity-
protecting cultural commitments.
IV. THE DISAGGREGATION STRATEGY
One possible way in which we could address the limitations of the
two strategies surveyed above is by combining them. Many scholars
seem to veer towards this mixed position, which consists either in a
dual-tracked ‘freedom of religion and conscience’,34 or a more radical
protection of ‘people’s sense of obligation and … core beliefs and
identity.’35 These are promising strategies. However, in my view,
they face a dilemma. Either they do not go far enough and, by
singling out freedom of religion as a specific kind of freedom, they
reproduce the same difficulties as the proxy strategy. Or they suc-
32 Wenger, We Have a Religion.
33 For a comparison, see Lori G. Beaman, ‘Aboriginal Spirituality’. Beaman complains that ‘In
Canada, where group rights and the correcting of systemic disadvantage are constitutionally possible,
aboriginal claims are framed as treaty rights… resulting in the minimization or marginalization of issues
concerning religious freedom’. It may be the case that Aboriginal rights are not given sufficient weight,
but the argument that this is because their ‘‘religious freedom’’ has been denied assumes what has to be
demonstrated, namely, that the category of religious freedom is the most suitable to protect Aboriginal
rights.
34 Micah Schwartzmann, ‘‘Religion as Legal Proxy’’. See also Koppelman’s rejoinder: ‘‘Religion as a
Bundle of Legal Proxies. Response to Micah Schwartzman’’, San Diego Law Review 51 (2014). As
Schwartzmann notes, the double protection of religion and conscience is in fact the actual law in many
jurisdictions, including in the text of international conventions, such as the ECHR. For an early defense
in the US context, see Rodney K. Smith, ‘‘Converting the Religious Equality Amendment into a Statute
with a Little ‘‘Conscience’’‘‘, BYU L. Review (1996), pp. 645–688.
35 Alan Patten, ‘‘Three Theories of Religious Liberty’’, paper presented to the APSA Annual
Meeting, Washington D.C. 28 August–1 September 2014, p. 11.
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ceed in providing a non-sectarian description of the plurality of
values that underpin freedom of religion but, in that case, they
become indistinguishable from the disaggregation strategy. In what
follows, therefore, I go straight to sketching my own version of
disaggregation, without ruling out the possibility that a radical mixed
strategy, if suitably formulated, would be equally compelling.
The disaggregation strategy builds on an innovative proposal
made by James Nickel in a 2005 article entitled ‘Who Needs Free-
dom of Religion?’.36 The gist of Nickel’s argument is that freedom of
religion does not need to be singled out by the law as a special
freedom. Religious activities and practices can be adequately pro-
tected through generic liberal rights of belief, thought, expression,
privacy, association, conscience, and so forth. This means that reli-
gious freedom is derivative, like scientific freedom or artistic free-
dom: it is implied and entailed by basic liberal freedoms, and justified
on the same grounds as them. The fact that a liberty is derivative
does not mean that it is less important. While there is much to learn
from Nickel’s approach, it is, in my view, deficient in two ways.
First, Nickel suggests that freedom of religion can be removed from
the list of derivative rights. The disaggregation strategy, by contrast,
makes no such claim: it merely aims to interpret the notion of reli-
gion in law (regardless of whether the category of freedom of reli-
gion is upheld or not). Second, Nickel does not specify in sufficient
detail the different dimensions of religion which freedom of religion
protects; nor does he explain how his reductionist approach to
religion relates to other normative values such as equality, non-
discrimination and non-establishment.37
The starting point of the disaggregation strategy is to suggest that
different parts of the law should capture different dimensions of
religion for the protection of different normative values. Consider
the following, non-exhaustive list of legally-relevant dimensions of
religion.
1. Religion as a conception of the good life
2. Religion as conscientious moral obligation
3. Religion as key feature of identity
36 James Nickel, ‘‘Who Needs Freedom of Religion?’’, University of Colorado Law Review 76 (2005) pp.
941–964.
37 But see, for a more extensive treatment, James Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights. 2nd ed.
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2007).
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4. Religion as mode of human association
5. Religion as vulnerability class
6. Religion as totalizing institution
7. Religion as inaccessible doctrine
This plurality of dimensions of religion has been obscured by the
two strategies we have considered so far. The proxy strategy tends to
bundle them all together and make them the normative basis of a
special kind of freedom, ‘religious freedom’. Yet, it is unclear that
freedom of religion is the right normative framework to capture all
these dimensions. The substitution strategy, for its part, tends to
collapse religion into conceptions of the good and conscience and, as
a result, has little to say about the other dimensions. In what follows,
I shall focus on dimensions 1–4, as they are directly relevant to the
notion of freedom of religion which has concerned us here.38
Recall that, on the interpretive theory that I favour, it is not
enough simply to say ‘religion is X and Y’. What is required is to
identify the specific normative values which makes X or Y legally
relevant. Just saying that a practice or institution is multi-faceted and
internally complex, and irreducible to anything else (as is surely the
case with religion) does not mean that it must be recognized as such
in the law.39 But, by parity of reasoning, nor does disaggregating the
various empirical dimensions of religion in itself provide a reason for
legal cognizance of any of them. So we need to know what kind of
good is being protected in every case, and the good cannot be as-
sumed to follow from the mere description of the empirical
dimension of religion. With this in mind, let me briefly discuss the
four first cases in turn.
38 Elsewhere, I show that seeing religion as a vulnerable class is crucial to theories of equality and
non-discrimination; whereas seeing religion as a totalizing institution and inaccessible doctrine helps
account for the value of non-establishment and (minimal) secularism.
39 This is the problem with Michael McConnell’s argument, which derives from the fact that religion
is uniquely complex the conclusion that it should be specially protected. But this is a non sequitur. He
writes: ‘‘Religion is a special phenomenon, in part, because it plays such a wide variety of roles in
human life: it is an institution, but it is more than that; it is an ideology or worldview, but it is more
than that; it is a set of personal loyalties and locus of community, akin to family ties, but it is more than
that; it is an aspect of identity, but it is more than that; it provides answers to questions of ultimate
reality, and offers a connection to the transcendent; but it is more than that. Religion cannot be reduced
to a subset of any larger category. In any particular context, religion may appear to be analogous to
some other aspect of human activity - to another institution, worldview, personal loyalty, basis of
personal identity, or answer to ultimate and transcendent questions. However, there is no other human
phenomenon that combines all of these aspects; if there were such a concept, it would probably be
viewed as a religion’’. Michael W. McConnell, ‘‘The Problem of Singling Out Religion’’, De Paul Law
Review 50 (2000), pp. 1–47, at p. 42.
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1. When religion is conceived as a conception of the good, it should be
tracked by generic liberal freedoms such as freedom of belief, thought,
speech, and so forth. Freedom of religion, here, is simply derivative of a
broader value, which itself justifies those generic freedoms – liberals
usually refer to individual autonomy, or self-determination, or the
capacity to pursue and develop the conception of the good that one in
fact holds. The religious life, on this view, is one of the many ways for
individuals to exercise their first ‘moral power’, to use John Rawls’s
phrase. For many purposes of legal protection of religion, the content
of religion does not need to be specified, because freedom of religion is
merely derivative of this more general right of ethical independence –
the right to form, develop and pursue one’s conception of what makes
life good. Religious beliefs here have exactly the same status as any
other belief, preference, commitment, or worldview. In a liberal state,
there is a presumption that citizens should enjoy wide freedoms of
thought, belief and speech, and that the state should not be in the
business of judging or evaluating what people are up to. Liberal neu-
trality rightly counsels a ‘religion-blind’ tolerance or respect for all
conceptions of the good.40
However, as I noted above, this presumption of freedom is not
strong enough to generate a claim to be exempted from laws and
regulations that apply to all. And yet, most liberals argue that
exemptions are sometimes legitimate. So how can exemptions be
justified? Consider the following examples. Freedom of expression
entails that we are free to wear what we like on the street, from a
clown’s hat to a Muslim hijab. But in workplaces where employees
are required to be bare-headed, we need a principle that would
justify exempting wearers of hijab but not of clown’s hats. In
exemption and accommodations cases, therefore, the liberal default
of neutrality about the good is not available, and Taylorian strong
evaluations are required.41 So what is the particular value which
religious dress, but not eccentric hats, expresses? Egalitarian theorists
of religious freedom, as we saw, located it in the value of
conscientious action.
40 With the usual proviso that people should not infringe on the rights of others, etc.
41 See Cécile Laborde, ‘Protecting Religious Freedom in the Secular Age’, in Winnifred Fallers
Sullivan, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Saba Mahmood and Peter G. Danchin (eds.), Politics of Religious
Freedom (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2015).
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2. Special legal protection for religion as conscientious obligation, in turn, is
justified by more specific appeal to the value of integrity. As we have
seen, we have good reasons to think that integrity is a non-sectarian,
ecumenical value. There is a specific harm caused by being prevented
from doing what you feel is right, as opposed to what you would prefer
to do, or what would make you happy.42 But while ethical integrity –
doing what you feel is right – is the correct interpretive value, it is not
the case that it is only exhibited in conscientious action. Arguably,
people act with integrity when they follow strongly valued practices,
when they express ‘core beliefs and identity’,43 to use Alan Patten’s
phrase, regardless of whether this is demanded by their conscience or
not.
3. Special legal protection for religion as key feature of identity, therefore,
can also be justified by appeal to integrity. The argument that, for
purposes of exemptions, religion should be interpreted, not only as
conscientious belief but also as one form of meaning-giving cultural
commitment, has often been resisted by political theorists.44 Yet this
suspicion is rooted in two mistaken assumptions. The first is that
religion essentially is different from culture. This may well be the case
– and it is easy to provide theological, sociological, anthropological,
political, and phenomenological accounts of this difference. The
question that preoccupies us, though, is not a semantic or descriptive
but, rather, an interpretive question. When we think of legal exemp-
tions, the question we ask is as follows: What kinds of commitment are
so important to people that their integrity would be threatened, were
they prevented from acting on them? The onus is on critics to explain
why certain kinds of cultural commitments would be less important to
people than religious commitments.
The second mistaken assumption is that if the law aims to protect all
integrity-promoting practices, whether religious, cultural, ethical, etc.,
it will protect everything, and therefore nothing. There is something to
this worry, but it is exaggerated. First, ethical integrity is defined so as
to exclude the protection of trivial practices that only hold a marginal
42 See also Chandran Kukathas who writes that individuals have a basic human interest ‘in living in
accordance with the demands of conscience. For among the worst fates that a person might have to
ensure is that he is unable to avoid acting against conscience – that he be unable to do what he thinks is
right’ in The Liberal Archipelago, p. 55.
43 Patten, ‘Three Theories of Religious Liberty’, p. 11.
44 See Avigail Eisenberg, ‘Religion as Identity’, paper presented to the APSA Annual Meeting,
Washington D.C. 28 August–1 September 2014.
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place in an individual’s conception of the good or identity. One
advantage of the approach is that it has the resources to accommodate
the wearing of hijab as well as aboriginal practices; and to refuse
accommodation to wearers of clown’s hats. There will inevitably be
hard cases, but – I would argue – they are not intrinsically more
troublesome than those generated by alternative approaches. Second, it
is not clear that the proposed approach would be less easily adminis-
trable than existing legal practice. Judges, when dealing with freedom
of religion and freedom of conscience cases, already apply complex
tests of sincerity, centrality, meaningfulness, and so forth. They do so,
usually, in order to define whether a practice is properly religious or
not. The disaggregation approach, by contrast, bypasses the need to
settle on the semantics of what is religious and what is not.45 Third, the
more specific fear of exemption proliferation can also be alleviated. We
can assume that only individuals with integrity-upholding commit-
ments will go to the trouble of requesting accommodations in the first
place. Furthermore, because (on my theory at least) ethical integrity
does not carry the pro tanto weight conventionally accorded to claims
of freedom of religion and conscience, it will only justify exemptions
from a narrow range of laws and regulations (amongst which most
cases of exemptions from dress codes).46
4. Religion as a mode of human association. Consider the liberal freedoms
that are broadly connected to this: freedom of association itself, free-
45 In private correspondence, Andrew Koppelman has put the following objection to me. ‘During
Prohibition, the Volstead Act exempted sacramental wine. No attempt was made to examine individual
Catholic priests and parishioners to determine the depth of their conviction. If ‘religion’ is not cog-
nizable, it is hard to imagine how that could have been done… That is why proxies are indispensable’.
This is an important objection. In response, I would say two things. First, this is better understood as a
right of collective exemption – a right held by the church as a whole, so on my theory it would fall
under freedom of association (and the use of sacramental wine could be linked to a core purpose of the
association). Second, even if construed on the model of individual exemption, the argument would be
that the use of sacramental wine during church services is central to the integrity of the communicant.
It is quite possible that the most effective way to account for this is directly to appeal to what we know
about the importance of religion in general, and sacraments in particular. But this is different from
saying that it is freedom of religion as such that is doing the work here. Consider the following analogy.
Take the case of drug control. If doctors can show that they need to use other illegal drugs, in a
controlled environment, for important medical purposes, then doctors should get an exemption. By
analogy, if a group can show that they use drugs, in a controlled environment (ie, without subverting
the aims of the law which targets addiction etc), for central religious purposes, then this group should
also get an exemption. We don’t need freedom of religion to make this claim – even if ‘religion’ is useful
as an explanation of the activities of the group (just as a ‘medical’ is useful as an explanation of the
activities of doctors - but they don’t need to invoke medical freedom as a special right).
46 This argument does not follow from the conceptual strategy of disaggregation but needs to be
backed by a full theory of egalitarian justice. I develop an argument to this effect in Liberalism’s Religion,
manuscript in progress.
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dom of expression and speech, freedom of peaceful assembly, eco-
nomic freedom, political participation. Arguably, these freedoms do
not flow – at least, not directly or exclusively – from the value of
ethical integrity (so they do not justify the extension of individual rights
of accommodation to corporate rights of exemption). Yet such free-
doms are crucial to the vitality of churches and religious associations,
and to the diverse activities they take as central to the pursuit of their
purposes. Some religions emphasize preaching and proselytising, oth-
ers, charity work, yet others, successful business activities. Some focus
on the preservation of community ways of life; others on the visible
display of signs of religious membership; yet others, on personal ethics
and conscience. If we take a broad view of the scope of religious
activities, we can ‘avoid the misconception that we have to find all
protections for religious activity within a phrase like ‘the free exercise
of religion’ or ‘freedom of thought, conscience and religion’.47 So the
suggestion here is that even if we grant religious freedom as such lesser
weight than existing approaches, we can still offer great scope for pro-
tection of religious practices and activities. The disaggregation strategy
does not assume that all religious activities and practices must be
protected in the name of freedom of religion. In particular, it rejects the
tendency, within existing approaches, to capture the interpretive value
of religion exclusively in terms of freedoms of belief, thought, or
conscience.
V. CONCLUSION
The disaggregation strategy, I hope to have demonstrated, improves
both on the substitution and proxy strategies. Unlike the proxy
strategy, it does not single out freedom of religion as a special
freedom protecting a loose cluster of activities and practices. Unlike
the substitution strategy, it does not assume that all that freedom of
religion protects should be protected under the label of freedom of
conscience. As a result, the disaggregation strategy meets the three
desiderata which I outlined at the start of this paper. It is not narrow,
because it protects a broad range of associational, expressive activi-
ties, including those religious activities that are not obligations of
conscience. It is not sectarian, because it is rooted in the ecumenical
47 Nickel, ‘Who Needs Freedom of Religion?’, p. 951.
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value of ethical integrity, and in the normative justifications for
generic liberal rights such as speech and association. And it is not
unfair to non-religious citizens, because it respects their meaning-
giving commitments, whether they are conventionally religious,
cultural, or philosophical. The disaggregation approach, in a word, is
religion-blind without being religion-insensitive, because it sees
religion, not as a specialised and self-contained area of human belief
and activity, but as a richly diverse expression of life itself.
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